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Japan’s Changing ODA Policy
Towards China
Masayuki Masuda
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
This article benefited from the constructive criticisms of Dr. Peter Van Ness, the
Contemporary China Center at the Australian National University, Dr. Isabelle Thireau,
Centre d’Etudes sur la Chine Moderne et Contemporaine and Mr. Kinichi Komano,
Japan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan. The author thanks Representative Yasuhisa
Shiozaki for his co-operation with the interview.
1 Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) towards China has come to a crossroads
at the start of the new millennium. It was more than twenty years ago, at the end of
1978, that the then prime minister Ohira said the government of Japan would offer ODA
to China.
1
 By the tax year of 1999 Japan had provided China with loans of 2,453.5 billion
Japanese yen (US$21.52 billion)  and grant  aid of  118.5  billion yen (US$1.04 billion),
together with technical co-operation of 116.3 billion yen (US$1.02 billion). Japan’s ODA
to China as  a  whole,  mainly though yen loans,  contributed to the alleviation of  an
infrastructure bottleneck in China’s coastal regions and a stabilisation of China’s micro
economy. According to Japan’s Economic Co-operation Programme for China published in
October 2001, Japan’s ODA policy to China has been based on the following idea:
“In order  to  maintain and strengthen the security  and prosperity  of  Japan,  the
maintenance of a peaceful environment is essential as, indeed above all,  are the
stability and prosperity of the East Asia region in which Japan is located. In order to
achieve this, it is necessary to create an environment of co-operation in which no
country in the region is isolated. It is desirable from Japan’s perspective to have a
more open and more stable society in China that is willing and able to fulfil  its
responsibilities as a member of the international community ”
2
.
2 That is, Japanese diplomacy has a concrete tool, which other western countries do not
have, of its policy of engagement with China. In other words, ODA has been a vital
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element of Japan’s China policy. On the one hand Japan has tried to establish a solid
foundation  of  economic  interdependence  between  Japan  and  China  through  ODA,
mainly invested in China’s construction of its economic infrastructure, which would be
expected  to  contribute  towards  China  becoming  a  “responsible  power”  in  the
international community. On the other hand, especially after the end of the Cold War,
Japan has come to understand ODA as a form of sanctions
3
. Japan has twice suspended
ODA to China: in 1989 following the Tiananmen incident; and in 1995, in response to
China’s decision to continue nuclear testing. However in both cases, the suspensions
were only symbolic as they had little material impact on the Chinese economy. From
both of these perspectives, it  seems sensible that Japan preserve ODA to China as a
diplomatic tool of its policy of engagement policy.
3 Yet,  under  the  severe  economic  and  fiscal  circumstances  that  Japan  has  been
experiencing  for  more  than  ten  years  now,  together  with  changes  such  as  China’s
increasing economic and military power and emerging presence as a competitor, there
is an increasing scepticism among the Japanese public of ODA to China from a number
of points of view. One such factor leading to an accelerating trend among the public to
reconsider  the  ODA  policy  to  China  is  Japanese  frustration  towards  Chinese
intelligence-gathering  ships  and  naval  vessels,  which  became  very  active  around
Japanese territorial waters at the end of 1990s. A Chinese naval vessel appeared there
for the first time in May 1999, when a Haibing-723 passed through the Tsushima and
Tsugaru Straits, and advanced into the Pacific Ocean. Yomiuri Shimbun, one of Japanese
leading  newspapers,  criticised  Japan’s  ODA policy  towards  China  in  its  editorial  on
October 14th 2000:
 “If  China becomes a major military power and a serious threat to Japan due to
Japanese  economic  co-operation  that  eventually  enables  China  to  increase  its
military spending every year, the meaning of Japan’s ODA to China will surely come
into question. … Behind China’s maritime activities lies Peking’s maritime strategy,
which  sees  sea  waters  as  a  stage  for  China’s  political,  economic  and  military
struggle to secure its interests and resources. Unless China changes that strategy,
its maritime activities in waters surrounding Japan may continue. We want China to
clearly explain this point to dispel concern”
4
.
4 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has more recently understood that there is “a need
to listen to public opinion” and decided on May 11th 2000, that the ministry would set
up the Advisory Group on Japan’s Economic Co-operation to China in the Twenty-First Century
(Advisory Group) as a private advisory body to the director-general of the Economic Co-
operation Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a process of development of
the Country Assistance Programme to  China supposedly to be concluded by the end of
March 2001 based on “a great concern and critical opinion among Japanese people”
5
.
Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) also started to review Japan’s policy on
ODA to China in September 2000 at the Small Committee on Evaluation of Economic Co-
operation (Small Committee) and wrote the Generalisation and Guidelines of Economic Aid
to and Co-operation with China (Guidelines) at the end of 2000.
5 The purpose of this paper is to clarify the policy-making process for Japan’s policy on
ODA to China. Relations between Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Liberal
Democratic Party are central to understanding Japan’s present stance, and to posit a
number of the issues which Japan will be faced with in the near future.
Fragile support for Japan’s ODA to China
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6 The country assistance programmes are regarded as one of the government’s efforts to
enhance the efficiency and transparency of ODA based on Japan's Medium-Term Policy
on  Official  Development  Assistance.  Taking  account  of  the  political,  economic  and
social  situations  in  recipient  countries,  they outline  Japan’s  assistance plans  for  an
approximate five-year period, incorporating both the plans and the issues that must be
tackled  in  the  development  process.  The  Country  Assistance  Programme  to  China was
supposedly to be written by the end of March 2001. Although the Programme was not
drafted and announced by the end of March, the course of the programme had become
obvious before then
6
.
7 The Second Study Group on Country Assistance to China set up at Japan International Co-
operation Agency (JICA) in August 1997 produced a final report in February 1999. The
report pointed out that the ODA to China should prioritise the elimination of poverty,
of differentials among regions and environmental protection. It concluded also that the
ODA should be extended mainly to inland China
7
.  Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
made it clear in the Annual Report of the fiscal year of 1999, which reported to the
Cabinet  that  the  government  would  attach  greater  importance  to  projects  of
environment, agriculture and inland China
8
. The ministry did not have to set up the
advisory  body  because  the  course  of  the  Country  Assistance  Programme  to  China  had
already been made public before it decided to set up the Advisory Group. In response to
mounting domestic criticism of the ODA to China recently, the ministry felt it necessary
to take measures to develop a new assistance programme to China.
 “Harsh views” and criticisms of ODA to China
8 Japan’s white paper on its ODA policy, published at the end of March 2001, admitted for
the first time that there were “harsh views about (overseas) assistance to China” among
the Japanese public, pointing out the need to “reconsider how the assistance should be
given”
9
. The “harsh views” were caused mainly by a cooling of public feelings towards
China. A poll reported in 1996 and 1997 by Japan's prime minister's office showed that
the percentage of the Japanese who did not have feelings of friendship towards China
exceeded the percentage of those who did
10
, while another poll in 2000 showed that a
record 31% of the public thought Japan could be drawn into a war, up 10% from a 1997
poll, because of the delicate situation in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait
11
.
Although his visit to Japan in 1998 expected to ease Japanese pessimistic views of China,
China’s  President  Jiang  Zemin  repeated  condemnations  of  Japan  over  the  wartime
apology issue, along with ritualistic warnings of revived Japanese militarism, which did
nothing to improve these views.
9 Partly in response to these adverse trends, “harsh views” about Japan’s ODA to China
have  been  on  the  rise  since  the  end  of  the  1990s.  China  ranked  second  following
Indonesia in terms of  total  ODA received,  and first  in recent years.  Harsh criticism
against  Japan’s  economic  co-operation  with  China  rose  among the  Japanese  public,
especially in 2000
12
.
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Graph 1: Japanese Intimacy with China
Source: Naikakuhu Ddijinkanbou kouhoushitsu (Japanese prime minister’s ofﬁce), Gaiko ni kansuru
yoronchos (A poll on diplomacy), October 2002. Available from the homepage of the Japanese prime
minister’s ofﬁce (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-gaikou/images/zu05.gif).
10 The first “harsh view” insists that the ODA has enabled China to reinforce its military
power and this may violate the principles of the ODA Charter decided by the cabinet on
June  30th 1992
13
.  Taro  Kohno,  a  LDP  congressman  in  the  House  of  Representatives,
pointed out in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: “If China is in the process of
increasing its strategic nuclear missiles, Japan must make a different diplomatic policy
in which its ODA policy towards China must be reconsidered”
14
.
11 The second “harsh view” stems from public discontent in Japan that China has shown
little gratitude for the ODA. Japanese Ambassador to China Tanino Sakutaro pointed out
that a “harsh view among the Diet and newspapers” to the Chinese side in Peking arose
when both governments signed the Loan Aid Exchange of Notes in the fiscal year of
1999 on March 27th 2000. He also requested that, “China should tell the Japanese that
Japan’s  assistance  in  the  past  twenty  years  has  been  useful  to  China’s  economic
development”
15
. Yan Wenchang, vice-minister of foreign affairs of the PRC, responded
to Tanino’s request, saying, “We highly value the role of Japan’s Yen Loan to China in
contributing to the building of our economy”. In spite of Yan’s remarks, at the Special
Committee on Overseas Economic Co-operation of the LDP held on March 29th 2000,
some members  of  the committee showed dissatisfaction with his  use  of  the phrase
“highly  value”.  Shinzo  Abe,  a  member  of  the  committee  and  the  House  of
Representatives,  said,  “China  recognises  Japan’s  ODA as  a  sort  of  a  compensation”.
Strong dissatisfaction of a lack of expressed appreciation was voiced in the committee
16
.
12 The third “harsh view” is based on the fact that China is now expanding its aid to third
countries.   Sankei  Shimbun on May 14th 2000 reported this  issue  with the  headline,
“China’s Strategic Aid is growing steadily”. Sankei Shimbun on July 17th 2000 reported
this again on the front page, insisting that they could not help being sceptical about
Japan’s offering ODA to China based on the fact that China’s ‘strategic aid’ has reached
six billion Japanese yen a year to fifteen developing countries
17
. Review of Japan’s ODA
to China has been insisted upon in the Diet and the LDP based also on China’s strategic
aid. At a plenary session of the House of Councillors on September 26th 2000, Yoshitada
Konoike,  a  member of  the LDP and the House of  Councillors,  said,  “China gives six
billion yen in aid to fifteen developing countries. We should reconsider what our ODA
to this country should be”
18
.
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Japanese frustration with China’s military modernisation and rapid growth in spending
13 The Japanese public is critical of their country’s ODA to China for a number of reasons.
In the first half of 2000, they especially regarded it as contravening a principle of the
ODA  Charter  that  full  attention  be  paid  to  trends  in  recipient  countries’  military
expenditures, their development and production of weapons of mass destruction and
missiles,  arms  exports,  and  to  extending  ODA  such  that  it  might  strengthen  the
recipient country’s military power.
14 A special committee on overseas economic co-operation of the LDP was held on the
morning of March 29th 2000.  Japanese foreign affairs reported Ambassador Tanino’s
proposal that China itself should inform Japan that its assistance in the past twenty
years  had  been useful  to  China’s  economic  development,  at the  special  committee.
Some  LDP  members  valued  the  proposal  to  China,  but  a  number  pointed  out  that
Ambassador Tanino should have noted a number of alarming developments in China:
military modernisation and rapid growth in military spending. The ministry met the
party’s requirement quickly. On the evening of May 29th, Ambassador Tanino conveyed
the LDP requirements to China at a signatory ceremony of Grant Assistance on the
Project for Improvement of an Environmental Information Network:
“At  a  committee of  the LDP held this  morning,  it  was  pointed out  that  China’s
growth  in  military  expenditure  which  was  made  public  at  the  National  People
Congress, exceeds greatly the economic growth rate. They discussed this seriously
with regard to Japan’s ODA Charter ”
19
.
15 Japanese foreign minister Yohei Kono also expressed concern over China’s increasing
defence budget, saying that Japan would review its ODA to China
following criticism in Japan about aid oﬀered to this country
with a  booming economy in  his  meeting with Chinese  foreign
minister Tang Jiaxuan on May 10th 2000 in Tokyo
20
.
16 The  LDP’s  foreign  and  related  panels  required  the  foreign  ministry  to  convey  this
intention to review its ODA to China to the Chinese side immediately before the foreign
ministerial  talks.  At  the  sectional  meeting,  some  members  criticised  China’s  active
saving of money to buy more military expenditure owing to Japan’s ODA
21
.
17 In  spite  of  this  criticism,  the  Japanese  foreign  ministry  dealt  mainly  with  China’s
military issues; one reason being the possibility of a violation of a principle of Japan’s
ODA Charter,  and the other  that  the  ministry  could not  yet  substantiate  the  other
criticisms. On China’s aid to other developing countries, for instance, Yutaka Iimura,
Director-General of the Economic Co-operation Bureau of the foreign ministry, had no
clear position when the Japanese government started its review of ODA to China in
August 2000:
 “We are not certain of the detail of China’s overseas aid.” “We are wondering if
Japan is in a position to criticise since we also extended assistance to developing
countries  with  a  loan  from  the  World  Bank.  Malaysia  and  Singapore  have  also
recently started to extend assistance [after receiving ODA from Japan]”
22
.
18 Mounting  domestic  criticism of  the  ODA given to  China  arose  not  only  among the
public but also in the Japanese political arenas, and reflected Japanese frustration with
China’s rapid military modernisation. But the Japanese foreign ministry was unable to
deal with public frustration.
Reviewing ODA or China policy?Tokyo only expressed fears
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19 A factor that accelerated Japan’s review of its ODA policy towards China was, as already
mentioned,  the increased activity  of  Chinese  intelligence-gathering ships  and naval
vessels around Japan at the end of the 1990s. It is assumed that the Haibing-723 that
passed  through  the  Tsushima  and  Tsugaru  Straits  investigated  Japanese  military
information in its circuit of Japan. Dongdiao-232, another naval intelligence-gathering
vessel, was in operation off the Irako Promontory and the Kii Peninsula to the south in
July 2000
23
.
20 Tokyo expressed its concerns on this issue through diplomatic channels. In June 2000,
at a one-day session of the seventh regular bilateral consultations on security issues
held in Peking, Japan raised the issue that Chinese research vessels had been spotted
with increasing frequency in Japanese territorial waters and economic zones, saying
they were not clear what China's intentions were.
24
 Japan also pointed out that Chinese
intelligence-gathering ships were operating there without Japanese permission,  and
made this clear, “(no Chinese activities by its research vessels) may take place without
Japanese consent”
25
 Furthermore, in his meeting with China’s foreign minister Tang in
Bangkok  in  the  end  of  July  2000,  Japanese  foreign  minister  Youhei  Kono  said  the
activities by Chinese intelligence-gathering ships had not gone unnoticed.
26
21 However, Japan's complaint about the ships was rejected by China, which said, "There
is no problem." Neither has China complied with a request to gain prior approval to
carry out marine research.
 “Special yen loans” to China
22 Two weeks after the first meeting of the Advisory Group, the Japanese government
decided  to  offer  “special  low-interest  yen  loans”  totalling  17.2  billion  yen  (US$159
million)  to  China for  two projects.  The Japanese foreign ministry explained that  to
extend “special  yen loans” to China did not contradict  the review of  ODA to China
because the “special yen loans” to Asian countries affected by the Asian financial crisis
in late 1997 came under a separate heading, and the projects under such a loan would
be  subject  to  environmental  protection  and  inland  development
27
.  In  addition  it  is
important to note that it is compulsory for recipient countries of the special loan to
supply a half of the amount of the loan extended by Japan. Keidanren (Japan Federation
of  Economic  Organisations)  telephoned  Yasuhisa  Shiozaki,  chairman  of  a  sectional
meeting of the LDP on foreign affairs saying, “it is necessary to offer the special yen
loan to China for the sake of Japan’s national interest”
28
. Not a few LPD members also
supported this view. 
23 The Japanese foreign ministry explained the plan to extend a “special  yen loan” to
China at a special committee on overseas economic co-operation of the LDP on August
2nd 2000
29
. A number of the members, however, criticised the government’s plan to offer
the loan to China considering the Chinese activity around Japan’s territorial waters
30
.
Yutaka Iimura, Director-General of the Economic Co-operation Bureau of the foreign
ministry,  stressed the significance of  ODA,  calling it  a  “linchpin of  Japan-China co-
operation” at an executive meeting on foreign affairs of the LDP held on August 3rd
2000.  Despite this,  the LDP did not give its  permission for a special  yen loan to be
offered to China. Keizo Takemi, a member of the House of Councillors, pointed out at
the meeting that a series of documents about the activities by Chinese intelligence-
Japan’s Changing ODA Policy Towards China
China Perspectives, 47 | May-june 2003
6
gathering  ships  and  navel  vessels  was  pressure  on  Japan  to  stop  its economic  co-
operation with China.
24 The foreign affairs and related panels of the LDP held on August 8th 2000, came to a
consensus  on  the  activities  of  these  ships  and  naval  vessels,  concluding  that  they
“threatened  Japanese sovereignty”.  The  LDP  required  the  foreign  ministry  to
reconsider how the ODA to China should be set in motion, and the offering of a special
yen loan. The panel also decided on the setting up of another sectional meeting to
study Japan’s economic co-operation with China
31
. The foreign and related panels of the
LDP  held  on  August  9th 2000  heard  a  number  of  criticisms  and  anger  about  the
government’s  plan  to  extend  the  loan.  Some  members  however  insisted  that  the
government’s  course  should  continue.  The  LDP  could  not  agree  about  the  loan.
Chairman Shiozaki,  at  a  sectional  meeting on foreign affairs,  proposed that  foreign
minister Kono would convey the critical atmosphere among LDP members in his visit to
China at the end of August and the LDP would have another consultation after the
foreign minister’s visit
32
. The LDP considered the issues on the special yen loan to China
at August 24th foreign affairs  panels.  The panel  concluded that the activities of  the
Chinese ships were an “issue relating to national security” and decided to postpone the
approval  for  a  special  yen loan
33
.  Furthermore,  a  LDP sectional  meeting on foreign
affairs  handed  over  a  letter  to  minister  Kono,  which  required  that  he  convey  the
Japanese anxiety about Chinese naval activities around Japanese territorial waters. 
25 The Japanese foreign ministry responded to the LDP’s criticism saying, “We have never
begun  any  procedure  for  a  special  yen  loan  during  the  foreign  minister’s  visit.”
According to Hidenao Nakagawa, chief cabinet secretary in the Japanese government,
however,  the government would never change the course of  extending the loan to
China
34
.  Japanese foreign minister Kono was also unwilling to change it,  “I  will  not
overlook today’s problems, but we should not overreact. We should sit down and talk”
35
. In view of the unsettled atmosphere in the party, foreign minister Kono conveyed
this concern and anxiety to China’s foreign minister during his visit to Peking at the
end  of  August.  During  the  talks,  Kono  also  demanded  that  China  enhance  the
transparency of its assistance to third countries and Chinese security policy. As for the
issues of Chinese intelligence-gathering ships, both ministers agreed that the two sides
would build a framework of giving prior notice.
26 Some members in the LDP tried to cool criticism of ODA to China. After the foreign
minister’s  visit  to  Peking,  foreign  and  related  panels  of  the  LDP  were  held  on
September 7th. Muneo Suzuki, a representative, supported offering the loans to China,
“an appropriate person in China agreed to build a ‘framework of prior notice’. Japan
already  promised  to  offer  special  yen  loans  to  China”
36
.  Further  refutation  of  the
criticism of ODA to China, based on China’s wish to sponsor the Commemoration of
Twenty Years of Economic Co-operation Between Japan and China sponsored by the
Chinese government in October 2000 was also expressed at the meeting
37
.
27 The LDP as a result approved only the two special yen loans projects and decided that
other special loans would not be permitted. Furthermore, the September 7th meeting of
the LDP came to a consensus to study a long-term China policy including economic co-
operation
38
. The party expanded the object of reviewing ODA to include Japan’s China
policy. The LDP held the first meeting of a small committee on evaluation of overseas
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co-operation  to  discuss  the  review.  Keizo  Takemi,  a  chairman  of  the  committee,
stressed a need to review Japan’s overseas co-operation: 
 “To develop an item-by-item discussion on what our economic co-operation with
China should be, contributes to deepening our general understanding of the nature
of the Japan-China relationship”
39
.
“Two reports” on the ODAAttempts to cool the criticism
28 Japan’s foreign ministry began to actively cool criticism of ODA to China from October
2000. This was necessary in view of China’s wish to sponsor the Commemoration of
Twenty Years of Economic Co-operation Between Japan and China, and also for China’s
premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Japan in the same month. The commemoration ceremony
sponsored by Chinese government was held in Peking on October 8th 2000.  Chinese
Councillor Wu Yi addressed the Commemoration stating at the ceremony “on behalf of
the Government of China, I would like to express my gratitude to the Government of
Japan for the support  extended for the construction of  the Chinese economy”.  Zhu
made reference to Japan’s role in furthering China’s economic modernisation to Mr
Nonaka, the secretary-general of the LDP who had also joined the ceremony. Zhu also
stated  that  China  would  strengthen  publicity  about  Japan’s  ODA  to  China  and  its
gratitude to Japanese prime minister Mori when he visited Japan.
29 Muneo Suzuki,  a deputy chairman of a special committee on overseas co-operation,
reported the visit by the secretary-generals of the LDP to China at the panels on foreign
affairs  on  October  11th 2000.  He  stressed  the  significance  of  the  ODA  to  China  by
referring  to  Zhu’s  remarks
40
.  The  Japanese  foreign  ministry  also  explained  the
scheduled visit to Japan by Zhu at the joint meeting. The ministry explained that the
aim of Chinese Premier’s visit was to cement the Japan-China partnership of friendship
and  co-operation  and  to  settle  a  series  of  troublesome  issues  such  as  the  Chinese
intelligence-gathering ships.  After Zhu’s  visit,  the LDP convened foreign affairs  and
related  panels  on  October  15th 2000.  The  Japanese  foreign  ministry  explained  the
significance  of  Zhu’s  visit  to  Japan  as  Japan-China  friendship  on  the  basis  of  the
framework of prior notice
41
.
The “Kamei remarks” and the amount of the ODA to China
30 With criticism of ODA to China cooling to some degree, the foreign ministry and the
LDP began concrete  discussions on conduct  the reports.  The fourth meeting of  the
Advisory Group was held at the end of September. Yutaka Iimura, Director-General of
the Economic Co-operation Bureau of the foreign ministry, showed a proposal for the
recommendations at the meeting. After this meeting, members of the group discussed
mainly priority issues and focus areas of Japan’s ODA policy towards China as well as
the current status of Japan-China relations and the outlook for the future.
31 A public concern about the recommendations of the advisory group was whether the
amount of ODA to China would be reduced. Iimura at the fifth meeting of the advisory
group  remained  deliberately  vague,  “the  LDP  is  discussing  Japan’s  economic  co-
operation”,  and  “I  feel  it  is  difficult  to  conclude  the  recommendations  without
referring to the amount”
42
.  Again,  at  the sixth meeting,  he said that a focus of  the
recommendations was the amount of ODA to China. Tokyo Shimbun on October 18th 2000
reported in its morning paper that the government had made a decision to reduce by
10% to 20% the ODA to China.  In response Iimura emphasised that  any decision to
reduce  the  ODA  to  China  would  be  made  by  the  Japanese  government.  “The
government is now aiming to develop the Country Assistance Programme to China. We will
Japan’s Changing ODA Policy Towards China
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settle a way of considering the amount during the development process”
43
. Although
the Japanese foreign ministry felt it difficult to conclude a recommendation without
referring to the amount, Iimura preferred not to make public the recommendations
about cutting ODA to China because the ministry regarded the ODA as a “linchpin of
Japan-China co-operation”.
32 Japan feared Chinese anger if it made public the reduction on the grounds of Chinese
military and diplomatic issues
44
.
33 Yet, on November 9th 2000, Sizuka Kamei, the Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research
Council of the LDP, suddenly proposed reducing the ODA budget across the board by
approximately 30%. The foreign affairs and related panels of the LDP held on November
14th tabled the “Kamei Remarks” as a main agenda for discussion. At this meeting, the
deputy-chairman  Tanitsu  explained  that  the  remarks  intended  that  ODA  should
consider public opinion, the economic and fiscal situation, and the national interest
45
.
While  a  number  of  participants  criticised  the  remarks  for  being  unexpected  and
proposed without  prior  consultation,  the  majority  supported review and reduction.
Katsuto  Asano,  a  parliamentary  vice-minister  of  foreign  affairs,  stressed  the
importance of ODA as a “diplomatic tool” by stating, “Japan is a trading country. For
our  country,  promoting  world  peace  and  the  free  trade  system  contributes  to  our
national interest. The aim of expending ODA is right”.
34 At the end of November 2000, the advisory group concluded an original plan of the
recommendations and reported it at a joint meeting on foreign affairs of the LDP on
November 29th. The group and the foreign ministry considered how to determine the
amount  of  ODA to  be  offered  to  China,  as  well  as  six  focus  areas  in  economic  co-
operation with China, making the deciding factor for the level of ODA comprising of
yen loans, grant aid and technical co-operation the so-called “projects accumulation
formula”, but without previous levels being a prerequisite in this decision. In other
words,  according  to  the  final  recommendations  by  the  advisory  group,  “while
responding to  new requirements  to  aid  in  China,  it  is  appropriate  to  examine  and
implement each individual project requested, with a focus on the priority areas and
issues  as  outlined  in  the  following  section,  taking  into  consideration  the  severe
economic and fiscal situation Japan currently faces”
46
.
35 Paying  attention  to  this  original  plan  of  the  recommendations  and  the  so-called
“projects accumulation formula”, the evening edition of Nikkei Shimbun on November
29th and the morning edition of Asahi Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun on November 30 th
reported that  the government would reduce the amount of  ODA to China
47
.  Yutaka
Iimura stressed that the foreign ministry was considering the “projects accumulation
formula”  in  a  round-table  discussion  with  the  press  on  November  30th 2000.  He
explained that the amount of ODA to China could increase and decrease on the basis of
the “projects accumulation formula”
48
.
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Graph 2: Good sino-Japanese relations ?
Source: Naikakuhu Ddijinkanbou kouhoushitsu (Japanese prime minister’s ofﬁce), Gaiko ni kansuru
yoronchos (A poll on diplomacy), October 2002. Available from the homepage of the Japanese prime
minister’s ofﬁce (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-gaikou/images/zu05.gif).
 “Recommendations” and “generalisation and guidelines”
36 Responding to the Kamei remarks, a joint meeting on foreign affairs of the LDP held on
December 7th 2000 discussed the ODA budget for the fiscal year of 2001 and came to a
consensus  to  conclude  a  report  on  Japan’s  economic  co-operation  to  China.  The
December 7th meeting was led by the representative Muneo Suzuki who had become a
deputy-chairman of the special committee on overseas economic co-operation owing to
the  fact  that  Chairman Seishiro  Eto  had  been transferred  to  a  parliamentary  vice-
minister of foreign affairs and drastic criticism was dormant
49
. The importance of the
economic  co-operation  to  China  was  agreed  on  the  whole,  with  “some  problems”
referring  to  a  series  of  criticisms
50
.  The  leaders  of  the  ruling  parties  agreed  on  a
position  built  by  the  ruling  parties’  project  team  to  scale  reductions  in  the  ODA
budget
51
. Japan’s ruling LDP demanded in a top-level meeting of the government and
the ruling parties that the loan be cut by more than 3%, to meet this scale
52
. The Small
Committee concluded an original plan for the Guidelines in the first week of December
2000, and Chairman Keizo Takemi reported the original plan at the LDP’s foreign affairs
and  related  panels  on  December  15th.  The  joint  meeting  basically  agreed  on  the
original plan though two passages noting Japan’s co-operation with Chinese agriculture
and forestry were amended
53
. 
37 The Guidelines says in their introduction, “ODA is an aid which comprises a part of
Japan’s  co-operation (with China)”.  The PLD had reviewed not  only  Japan’s  ODA to
China but also a series of “co-operation” policies: an untied loan by the former Export-
Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM); the use of Japanese public funds supplemented by NEDO
to subsidise environmental protection in China. The report also insists that “aid and co-
operation” to China provided by these funds have achieved the basic goal, which was
stated  to  be  to  “develop  the  (Japan-China)  economic  relationship  focusing  on  the
private sectors”. The report highlighted the necessity for “an ongoing evaluation” of
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ODA to China based on public opposition to its continuation revealed by the review
process. According to the report such an evaluation would cover security issues. The
LDP thus clearly positioned ODA to China not merely as “aid” but as an integral part of
Japan’s foreign and security policy
54
.
38 On the other hand, the Advisory Group had its final (9th) meeting on December 15th 
2000, when the chairman Isamu Miyazaki, special advisor to Daiwa Institute of Research
(former  minister  of  state  for  the  Economic  Planning  Agency),  handed  in  the
recommendations for the coming five-year term to foreign minister Kono
55
. Although
the Group “conducted a comprehensive review of Japan’s ODA to China, begun in 1979
on a cumulative basis, the subject of the review was actually only “ODA to China in the
Twenty-First  century”.  The  recommendations  clearly  state  that,  “even  as  Japan
continues to extend ODA to China, efforts should be made to ensure co-ordination with
other types of public funds and also with private-sector capital in order to ensure even
greater efficiency and effectiveness in achieving the goals of Japan’s co-operation with
China”,  but  the  subject  of  the  review  is  limited  to  ODA  to  China  in  general.  The
recommendations consider the aim of  extending ODA to China in the late  1970s as
being  “from  the  view  that  supporting  China’s  opening  and  reform  policy  would
promote the stability and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asian region and
the  world  as  a  whole”,  and  stressed  the  need  to  “encourage  China’s  enhanced
participation in the international community and to assist it in progressing towards
open society through such assistance” (ODA). They make no reference to the degree of
achievement of the aims set in the starting point to extend the ODA to China.
39 The recommendations do highlight putting ODA to practical use. On China’s assistance
to  third  countries,  about  which the  Japanese  foreign ministry  did  not  forward any
views  of  its  own,  the  recommendations  clearly  position  its  aim  to  be  to  promote
multilateral co-operation in East Asia:
 “Japan and China have agreed to the establishment of a new partnership through
which  they  will  move  beyond  the  stage  of  bilateral  “good-neighbourliness  and
friendship” and they will co-operate to resolve various issues facing the East Asian
region and the entire international community. In fostering this partnership, it is
extremely important to also achieve concrete results through ODA. For example,
Japan  promotes  a  so-called  South-South  co-operation,  through  which  it  works
together  with  nations  such as  Singapore,  Malaysia  and Thailand to  assist  other
developing countries.  Similarly,  together with China, Japan should co-operate in
assistance to third party countries in Africa and elsewhere. For example, by making
use  of  the  achievements  that  Japan  has  made  in  focused  support  for  human
resources development centres such as the Japan-China Friendship Hospital”.
40 THE CHINESE gave no negative reaction to the series of Japanese discussions on the
review of ODA to China. Regardless of China’s positive attitude to ODA, Japan’s move
towards reviewing its ODA to China was inevitable. This may imply a discrepancy in the
evaluation of Chinese status by the LDP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
41 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is doing all it can to preserve ODA to China as a
diplomatic tool of its engagement policy,  explaining that China is still  a developing
country where the priorities are poverty alleviation, environmental protection, and so
on. The Japanese foreign ministry does not deny that China is an “emerging power”, yet
in the foreseeable future China will  remain a developing country needing economic
assistance from Japan. The Japanese foreign ministry has not expressed the standard
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neither  to  the  LDP nor  to  the  Japanese  public,  by  which  China  would  graduate  to
become a developing country.
42 According to Japan’s 2001 Economic Co-operation Programme for China, “China achieved an
average real GDP growth rate of 9.6% a year in the twenty-one-year period from 1979 to
1999, and emerged as the seventh largest country in the world in terms of GDP”. It may
be understood from this that Japan’s ODA contributed greatly to the growth of the
Chinese economy. In response to this situation of an “emergent China”, Japan-China
relations  are  no  longer  able  to  be  labelled  as  being  between  “donor-recipient
countries”. The LDP has as a result required the foreign ministry to change the title of
the new ODA plan from Country “Assistance” Programme to Economic “Co-operation”
Programme, because the party does not evaluate China as a developing country that
needs economic assistance from Japan. That is, the Japanese foreign ministry reviewed
conditions in order to extend ODA to China as a developing country and the LDP began
a review of the whole of Japan’s policy to China as an emerging power.
43 It is hard to deny the importance of developing a stable and co-operative relationship
with China. The LDP asked, what sort of future scenarios with China would be desirable
for Japanese national interests. Based on this, the party tried to develop a new national
policy towards China as an “emerging power” focusing on economic co-operation. The
foreign ministry must therefore reconsider not only ODA but also its policy towards
China in  the  near  future.  Since  Japanese  prime minister  Keizo  Obuchi  and Chinese
president Jiang Zemin now share a common view, the basic framework of Japan-China
relations have already shifted from one of mutual “good neighbour and friendship” to a
new “partnership of friendship and co-operation” for peace and development in Asia
56
.
Asian  countries  as  well,  hope  both  countries  will  contribute  to  Asian  peace  and
development  in  an  age  of  globalisation.  In  both  Japan  and  China,  however,  public
support  for  a  new partnership  seems fragile.  What  response  officials  in  Tokyo and
Peking  will  give  after  the  review of  Japan’s  ODA  to  China  must  be  a  test  case  for
whether  Japan-China relations can move beyond the stage of  “good neighbour and
friendship” to a new partnership and whether the Japanese government can rebuild
public support for it.
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